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Abstract
In this note, we show that for every simple game with n players the
critical threshold value is at most n/4. This verifies the conjecture of
Freixas and Kurz.
1 Introduction
Let N be a finite set of players. We call a function v : 2N → {0, 1} monotone
if v(C) 6 v(S) for all C, S ⊆ N such that C ⊆ S. The pair (N, v) is called a
simple game if v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1 and v is a monotone 0/1 function. We refer
the reader to [7], [6] for further reading on simple games. A simple game (N, v)
partitions the collection of all possible player coalitions into two collections: the
collection of winning coalitions W := {C ⊆ N : v(C) = 1} and the collection
of losing coalitions L := {C ⊆ N : v(C) = 0}.
Weighted voting games are a natural family of simple games. A weighted
voting game is defined by a finite set of players N and a vector p ∈ RN , p > 0,
p(N) > 1, where
v(C) :=
{
1 if p(C) > 1
0 otherwise .
Here, we use the notation q(C) :=
∑
i∈C qi for a vector q ∈ RN and C ⊆ N .
Clearly, every weighted voting game is a simple game. To show that the
reverse is not true let us consider the following example from [3].
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} for some even n and the value function
v : 2N → {0, 1} be as follows
v(C) :=
{
1 if {2i− 1, 2i} ⊆ C for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n/2}
0 otherwise .
Obviously, coalitions {2i − 1, 2i}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n/2} are winning while the two
coalitions {1, 3, . . . , n− 1}, {2, 4, . . . , n} are losing.
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If the desired vector p ∈ RN exists for Example 1, then on one side
p(N) > n/2 and on the other side p(N) < 2, showing that for n > 4 this
game is not a weighted voting game.
To understand whether a simple game is a weighted voting game, we could
use the critical threshold value introduced in [4]. Before we define the critical
threshold value of a simple game, let us define the following polyhedron
Q(W) := {x ∈ RN : x(C) > 1 for C ∈ W , x > 0} .
The critical threshold value can be defined as
α = α(N, v) := min
p∈Q(W)
max
C∈L
p(C) .
Observe, that α < 1 if and only if the simple game (N, v) is a weighted voting
game.
The example in [3] shows that α can be as large as n/4, because 2
n
1 lies
in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of winning coalitions while 121
lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of losing coalitions. Freixas
and Kurz [3] conjectured that there is no simple game with a larger value of α.
Here, we state the variant of the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz from [5].
Conjecture 2 (Conjecture of Freixas and Kurz). For a simple game with
n players, the collection of winning coalitions W and the collection of losing
coalitions L, we have
α = min
p∈Q(W)
max
C∈L
p(C) 6 n/4 .
In [5] the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz was verified for simple games with
all minimal wining coalitions of size 3 and for simple games with no minimal
winning coalitions of size 3. In [5] it was shown that α 6 2n/7 for general simple
games.
Before going to the proof, we would like to say that our approach is inspired
by the work of Ahmad Abdi, Gérard Cornuéjols and Dabeen Lee on identically
self-blocking clutters [1] (Section 3).
2 Proof
To prove the conjecture we reformulate, strengthen and only then verify it. A
coalition C, C ⊆ N is called a cover of W if C has at least one common player
with every coalition in W . We call the collection of covers of W the blocker of
W and denote it by b(W)1 [2]. Due to the definition of simple games, we have
L = {N \ C : C ∈ b(W)} .
1Usually, blocker is defined as the collection of minimal covers. Here, for simplicity of
exposition we define blocker as the collection of all covers.
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Hence, the critical threshold value can be reformulated as follows
α = min
p∈Q(W)
max
L∈L
p(L) = min
p∈Q(W)
max
C∈b(W)
p(N \ C) =
min
p∈Q(W)
max
q∈Q(W)
q∈{0,1}N
〈p,1− q〉 .
Here, 〈p, q〉 stands for the scalar product of two vectors p and q.
Conjecture 3 (Reformulation of Conjecture of Freixas and Kurz). For a simple
game with n players and the collection of winning coalitions W, we have
min
p∈Q(W)
max
q∈Q(W)
q∈{0,1}N
〈p,1− q〉 6 n/4 .
Next, we prove Theorem 5, which is a strengthening of Conjecture 2. For
the proof we need the following straightforward remark, which we leave as an
exercise.
Remark 4. Let P be a polyhedron and let p⋆ be the optimal solution of the
program min{‖p‖2 : p ∈ P}. Then p⋆ is an optimal solution of the linear
program min{〈p⋆, q〉 : q ∈ P}.
Theorem 5 (Strengthening of Conjecture of Freixas and Kurz). For a simple
game with n players and the collection of winning coalitions W, we have
min
p∈Q(W)
max
q∈Q(W)
〈p,1− q〉 6 n/4 .
In particular, if p⋆ is the optimal solution for the program
min{‖p‖2 : p ∈ Q(W)} ,
then
max
q∈Q(W)
〈p⋆,1− q〉 6 n/4 .
Proof. Let us consider the unique optimal solution p⋆ for the program
min{‖p‖2 : p ∈ Q(W)}. By Remark 4, p⋆ is an optimal solution for the
program min{〈p⋆, q〉 : q ∈ Q(W)}. Thus, p⋆ is an optimal solution for the
program maxq∈Q(W)〈p⋆,1− q〉. Thus, we have
max
q∈Q(W)
〈p⋆,1− q〉 = 〈p⋆,1− p⋆〉 = n
4
− 〈1
2
1− p⋆, 1
2
1− p⋆〉 6 n
4
,
finishing the proof.
To finish the note, let us discuss when Conjecture 2 provides a tight upper
bound for the critical threshold value. The next theorem shows that if the upper
bound in Conjecture 2 is tight, then this fact can be certified in the same way
as in Example 1.
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Theorem 6. For a simple game with n players and the collection of winning
coalitions W and the collection of losing coalitions L, we have
α = min
p∈Q(W)
max
L∈L
p(L) = n/4
if and only if 2
n
1 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of winning
coalitions and 121 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of losing
coalitions.
Proof. Clearly, if 2
n
1 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of
winning coalitions and 121 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of
losing coalitions, then for every p ∈ Q(W) we have
max
L∈L
p(L) > 〈p, 1
2
1〉 = n
4
〈p, 2
n
1〉 > n
4
,
showing that α > n/4 and hence α = n/4 by Theorem 5.
On the other hand, from the proof of Theorem 5 we know that if α = n/4
then p⋆ = 121 is an optimal solution for min{〈p⋆, q〉 : q ∈ Q(W)} with value
n/4. Let us show that 2
n
1 lies in the convex hull of the characteristic vectors
of winning coalitions. To do that consider an optimal dual solution y⋆ for
the program min{〈p⋆, q〉 : q ∈ Q(W)}. Using complementary slackness it is
straightforward to show that 4
n
y⋆ provides coefficients of a convex combination
of characteristic vectors of winning coalitions, where the convex combination
equals 2
n
1.
In the same way as the proof of Theorem 5, we could show that
α 6 max
q∈Q(W)
q∈{0,1}N
〈q⋆,1− q〉 = 〈q⋆,1− q⋆〉 = n
4
− 〈1
2
1− q⋆, 1
2
1− q⋆〉 6 n
4
,
where q⋆ is the optimal solution for the program
min{‖q‖2 : q ∈ conv{r ∈ {0, 1}N : r ∈ Q(W)}} .
Thus, if α equals n/4, then q⋆ = 121 and
1
21 lies in conv{r ∈ {0, 1}N : r ∈
Q(W)}. Hence, if α equals n/4, then 1− q⋆ = 121 lies in the convex hull of the
characteristic vectors of losing coalitions, finishing the proof.
3 Open Questions
The question about asymptotic behaviour of the critical threshold value of
complete simple games remains open. These are the games with a total order
of players by "winning power". Freixas and Kurz [3] conjectured that the
critical threshold value of a complete simple game with n players equals O(
√
n).
Recently, in [5] it was shown that the critical threshold value of such games is
O ((lnn)
√
n).
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